(The Financial Times, October 20, 2010)

The security summit this week between Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and Dmitry Medvedev was always likely to be a non-event. France wanted something spectacular, Germany something reasonable, Russia something it could trade. So, the chances of a meeting of minds were slim. But the gathering at Deauville in northern France could turn out to be a non-event with consequences. When historians look back, this may be seen as the moment when leaders faced up to the fact that they are living in a multipolar Europe.

The very fact that the summit was held marks an end to the European Union’s solipsism. During the 1990s, many thinkers believed that Europe was becoming a “postmodern” continent, which no longer relied on a balance of power. National sovereignty and the separation of domestic and foreign affairs were deemed much less important. The EU and Nato would gradually expand until all European states were bound into this way of doing things. Until recently, it looked like that was happening. Central and eastern Europe were transformed, Georgia and Ukraine saw displays of pro-western people power, and Turkey moved steadily towards accession.

But now the prospects for this unipolar European order are fading. Russia, which was never comfortable with Nato or EU enlargement, is powerful enough to call openly for a new security architecture. Turkey, frustrated by the way in which some EU states have blocked membership negotiations, is increasingly pursuing an independent foreign policy and looking for a larger role. Add to this the fact that the US – its hands full dealing with Afghanistan, Iran and the rise of China – has ceased to be a full-time European power and you can see the multipolar Europe looming.

As a result, rather than a single multilateral order centred around the EU and Nato, we are seeing the emergence of three poles – Russia, Turkey and the EU – that are all developing “neighbourhood policies” designed to influence their respective, overlapping spheres of influence in the Balkans, eastern Europe, the Caucasus and central Asia. True, war between the major powers is unlikely. But competition is growing and the existing institutions were unable to prevent the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99, slow the arms race in the Caucasus, prevent cuts to the EU’s gas supply in 2008, prevent the Russo-Georgian war or arrest instability in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 – let alone make headway in resolving the continent’s other so-called frozen conflicts.

The central paradox is that the EU has spent much of the past decade defending a system that its own governments realise is dysfunctional. They resisted Moscow’s demands for talks about security to defend the status quo. But because the formal institutions have become deadlocked by rivalry, the EU, Russia and Turkey are increasingly working around them. For example, some EU member states recognised the independence of Kosovo in spite of Russian opposition; Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in spite of EU opposition; and Turkey co-operated with Brazil in formulating a response to Iran’s nuclear threat without consulting Nato. European leaders, by defending an illusion of order, risk making disorder a reality.

This is where the Deauville summit comes in. It has the right agenda, but the wrong participants. We think that rather than negotiating a new treaty or organising another meeting between Paris, Berlin and Moscow, the EU should set up an informal “security trialogue” with the powers that will shape its security in the 21st century – Russia and Turkey. If the EU proposed such a forum, it would move away from its defensive responses to Mr Medvedev’s 2008 proposal for a new security treaty. By giving Turkey a top-table seat – in parallel with accession negotiations – EU leaders could help to keep Turkey’s European identity alive while harnessing its soft and hard power in the neighbourhood. And if it was Lady Ashton – the EU foreign policy chief – rather than Berlin and Paris at the talks, member states could end the anomaly that the EU, one of the biggest providers of security in Europe, is not represented in any of the continent’s security institutions.

The EU needs a new strategic approach that is not about preventing war between Europe’s powers but helping them live together in a world where they are more at the periphery and where a collapsing neighbour can be as scary as a powerful one. The goal should be to create a trilateral rather than a tripolar Europe. Setting up an informal trialogue could give new life to the old institutional order and – to paraphrase Lord Ismay – work to keep the EU united, Russia post-imperial and Turkey European.

Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard are authors of "The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe", published by the European Council on Foreign Relations

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